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SECURITIES REGULATION-FEDERAL ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS-APPLICABILITY OF INSIDER R.EsPONSIBILITY TO BROKER IN POSSESSION OF INSIDE
CORPORATE INFORMATION-During a period of upward movement in the
price of Curtiss-Wright common stock, the corporation's board of directors
voted to reduce the stock dividend by forty percent, an action certain to have
an immediate adverse effect upon the stock's market price. Although the
board immediately authorized the transmission of information concerning
its action to the New York Stock Exchange,! an inadvertent delay of
forty-five minutes ensued. Unaware of the delay, C, a director of CurtissWright and a registered representative of Cady, Roberts & Co. (registrant) ,
a registered broker-dealer,2 telephoned registrant to inform G, one of its
partners, of the dividend reduction. G, knowing that this information had
not yet been publicized, took advantage of his knowledge by quickly selling
on the New York Stock Exchange 9,700 shares of the Curtiss-Wright stock
for the discretionary accounts of his customers. Thirty minutes later the
news of the dividend reduction reached the Exchange and the price of
Curtiss-Wright stock immediately dropped by almost four points. The
Securities and Exchange Commission instituted disciplinary proceedings
against G and registrant to determine whether the sale violated the
federal "anti-fraud" provisions: 3 section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of
1933,4 section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and rule
IOb-5.6 Held, both G and registrant7 are subject to sanctions8 for willfully violating these provisions. Although the "anti-fraud" provisions have
traditionally imposed a duty of disclosure upon "insiders," they also are
applicable to any person enjoying a special relationship whereby he has
access to confidential corporate information. Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC
Security Exchange Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961), CCH 1961 FED.
SEC. L. REP. i 76803.
At common law a private investor ordinarily had no duty to disclose
material information in his possession that might affect the price of stock
1 The Exchange requires an immediate public release of dividend information by an
issuer. Article III (4), Form of Listing Agreement, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL
A-28 (1953) •
2 Registrant was registered in compliance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 15 (b), amended by 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1958).
3 The case was heard under an offer of settlement that stipulated as to both the facts
and the penalty. Administrative Procedure Act § 5 (b), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1004 (b) (1958); SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (Supp. 1962).
4 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1958).
5 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949).
7 Registrant was found to be in violation because G acted in connection with his
duties as a partner of registrant. See H. F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833 (1948) •
s The SEC accepted G's and registrant's offer of settlement which provided that G
be suspended from the New York Stock Exchange for twenty days and that no action
be taken against registrant.
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involved in a transaction to which he was a party.9 Of greater importance,
perhaps, was the status of corporate "insiders" (e.g., directors, officers and
controlling shareholders10) who utilized corporate information in such
transactions. In a majority of states there was no duty for an "insider" to
disclose such information to the other party to the transaction, although
he was considered to be liable to the corporation for his action.11 Even in
the "minority rule" 12 and "special facts" 13 jurisdictions, where there was a
duty to disclose, breach of which would render the insider liable for damages to the defrauded party, only a defrauded vendor14 who did not sell
on an exchange15 could hope to prevail. The net result of this diversity
at the common law was that private investors were not fully protected
from misuse of information by insiders. Partially in recognition of this,
Congress enacted securities legislation designed to impose sanctions against
abuse of position by insiders and to encourage a wider dissemination of
information concerning corporate activity and financial status.16
Probably the most effective and encompassing federal weapon resulting
from the securities legislation is rule lOb-5.1 7 Its terms are almost identical
to those of section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, although it supplements that section by prohibiting fraudulent conduct in purchases as well
as sales of securities. It has often been recognized that rule I0b-5 is not
limited by common law standards of what constitutes fraud. 18 Certainly,
it imposes upon an insider a duty to disclose material corporate information when dealing in that corporation's stock.19 On the other hand, a
3 Loss, SECURlTIES REGULATION 1430-33 (2d ed. 1961).
While most common law cases dealt with directors and officers, recent cases under
federal legislation also recognize the controlling shareholder as an insider. E.g., Perlman
v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) .
11 E.g., Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) .
12 E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903) •
13 E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
14 No cases can be found at the common law imposing liability on a selling insider
who would otherwise have a duty to disclose. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1454-55 {2d
ed. 1961).
15 Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
16 See H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) ; S. REP. No. 792, 7lld Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55, 68 (1934) .
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949). "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or· of any facility of any national securities exchange (a) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
18 E.g., Norris &: Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949) .
19 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), afj'd on Tehearing, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952). It is well
9
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subject of frequent speculation has been whether-and to what extentrule IOb-5, phrased in terms of "any person," imposes upon outsiders the
insider's duty to disclose material information.20 Clearly, both outsiders
and insiders are within the scope of rule IOb-5 (b) when there have been
representations and statements incident to fraudulent conduct.21 However,
problems arise when, as in the principal case, there has been silence in
connection with a transaction. 22 With respect to this problem, it has been
held that a broker who knows of an insider's scheme to defraud the public
must disassociate himself from the transaction or be liable for fraud under
rule IOb-5. 23 Moreover, there has been some indication that an outsider
who gains access to confidential inside information as a result of business
negotiations or transactions with a corporation becomes subject to a duty
to disclose this information when dealing with that corporation's stock.24
Nevertheless, until the principal case, the issue raised by an outsider's use of
inside corporate information had not been squarely faced. 25
In the principal case the SEC, in finding that G, an outsider, had violated the federal "anti-fraud" provisions, was content to base its analysis
on the language of rule IOb-5 (c), which provides that it shall be unlawful
for any person "to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . ."2 6
The Commission pointed out that the statutory duty to disclose, although
traditionally applied to insiders, entailed two important elements: (I) the
existence of a special relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended for a corporate purpose rather than for anyone's personal benefit; and (2) the inherent unfairness involved in using such information when dealing with another.27 The fact that C was connected
with Curtiss-Wright as a director and with G's firm as a registered represettled that a defrauded investor can base a chil action for damages on rule IOb-5.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). It must nevertheless be shown that the plaintiff was dire,tly
injured by the wrongdoer as the result of a stock transaction. Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950); Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1951).
3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445 n.l (2d ed. 1961) •
In regard to liability under rule IOb-5 (a) , one court commented that "silence cannot be deemed to be the employment of 'any device, scheme or artifice'•.•." Joseph v.
Farnsworth Radio &: Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afj'd, 198
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) •
23 Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; cf. In re Hughes &: Treat,
22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946) •
24 Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (investigation report) •
211 Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (elements of common law
fraud present) ; Ward La France Truck Corp., supra note 24 (investigation report) ; cf.
Alexander Smith, 22 S.E.C. 13 (1946) •
26 Principal case, CCH 1961 FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 76803, at 81017.
21 Ibid.
20 E.g.,

21
22
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sentative was deemed to put G in the position of having such a "special
relationship" making him privy to Curtiss-Wright's internal affairs, while
G's use of the information transmitted by C was considered sufficiently
unfair to impose sanctions. Indeed, the SEC considered the unfairness so
great that the only available alternative to disclosure of confidential information was found to be a complete cancellation of the transaction.28
It is clear that the principal case establishes a new standard for promoting and enforcing fair dealing in stock transactions. However, the
future effectiveness of this policing device rests in large part upon the
meaning of the "special relationship" concept and the limits on the standard which might be imposed by it. The problem can be illustrated by
examining the limitations of the concept. If, for example, an employee of
a corporation did work that put him in contact with confidential information it is likely that his employment relationship would subject him to the
obligations of rule IOb-5.29 The apparent liability of an outsider who
transacts business with a corporation and picks up confidential information
in the process has already been discussed, and this, too, appears to be a
"special relationship." Moreover, the SEC would likely be unwilling to
allow a member of an insider's family to exploit information in a manner
prohibited to the insider himself. 30 The more difficult task comes in applying the requirement of a "special relationship" to an outsider who has no
employment, business or family connections with a corporation or its insiders. For example, what if the corporate director in the principal case
had not been associated with registrant, the facts merely indicating a
friendly call to G? Absent the business ties, it would be stretching the term
"special relationship" to its conceptual limits to apply it to a relationship
based solely on personal friendship. 31 Even more extreme is the situation
where an outsider has gained confidential information as a result of overhearing a conversation between insiders. Here there would clearly be no
"special relationship" to bring the outsider within the holding of the SEC
in the principal case. Yet, the language of rule I 0b-5 is broad in scope:
"any person" who engages in "any" act or practice resulting in fraud or
deceit has thereunder acted unlawfully. Thus, it is submitted that even
in the absence of a "special relationship" it would be unlawful for an outsider to utilize confidential information without disclosure. The essential
factor is the possession of confidential information by an outsider rather
Ibid.
Cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (employee liable
to corporation). But see Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921).
30 See In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947) (wife); Bemer v.
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949) (brother-in-law). See also In re
Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturer's Trust
Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949) .
31 But see REsrATEM:ENT, REsrlTUTION § 201 (2) (1937) .
28
29
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than the existence of a "special relationship." This is not to contend, as
respondents apparently did,32 that the duty to disclose would be extended
to include information gleaned by an outsider through independent market
analysis. The SEC made it clear that information intended only for corporate purposes must have reached the outsider directly or indirectly from
a corporation source before any duties under rule IOb-5 would arise.as
The main problem confronting the SEC would then appear to be proving that the outsider in fact obtained and used specific confidential corporate information in the transaction in question. This was not a problem
in the principal case since there was an offer of settlement in which the
respondents submitted a conclusive statement of facts indicating that C
passed confidential information to G. However, in the face of denials by
the parties that any such conduct occurred, the difficulties involved in
acquiring direct proof of wrongdoing could provide a substantial barrier to
enforcement. The crucial issue for the future, therefore, appears to revolve
around the effect that will be given to circumstantial evidence of fraudulent
conduct. The evidentiary difficulties are well illustrated by the facts of the
principal case, which revealed that before the Curtiss-Wright board of directors voted to reduce the stock dividend, G had already sold 6,500 shares
of Curtiss-Wright stock as a result of an earlier decision to liquidate that
stock from his discretionary accounts. Certainly, the further sale by G of
another 9,700 shortly after the board's decision would not be as clearly
tinged with fraud as when no sales had previously been made. In a similar
vein, it would seem that when a member or representative of the alleged
wrongdoer firm is also a member of the involved corporation's board of
directors, there would be a stronger presumption of fraud. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the association of a director with a
brokerage partnership does not impute the director's knowledge of corporate affairs to the partnership simply because it deals in the corporation's
securities.34 Thus, notwithstanding the fact that rule IOb-5 has given the
SEC an impressive vehicle for promoting and enforcing fair dealing in
securities transactions, the future effectiveness of the Commission's ruling
in the principal case may well depend on the standards of proof which
will be required thereunder.
I oh n A . K:rsu,l Jr.

Brief for Respondent, pp. 28-29, principal case.
SEc L. REP. 1f 7680!1, at 81017.
M Blau v. Lehman, !168 U.S. 40!1 (1962); see Rattner v. Lehman, 19!1 F.2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1952).
32

as Principal case, CCH 1961 Fm.

